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F E AT U R E

Montgomery, Crerar and the
Possibility of Canadian Military
Independence, 1944
J. L . G R A NAT S T E I N
Abstract : Bernard Montgomery and Harry Crerar were not friends, and
their relationship grew worse in September 1944 when Crerar skipped
a meeting at Montgomery’s headquarters to attend a commemorative
service at Dieppe. A furious Montgomery indicated that he wanted to
sack Crerar, and the Canadian responded that he would consult his
government. Monty quickly realized he could not easily get rid of the
First Canadian Army commander, but Crerar, fuming, asked Canadian
Military Headquarters to study how to secure more independence for
his army. The course of the war by late 1944 eventually rendered this
idea moot, but it was nonetheless an important, if hitherto unnoticed
moment, in Canada’s military history.

B

were never close.
The British military hero, the Commander in Chief of 21st
Army Group, and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of First
Canadian Army from March 1944 clashed in the field almost from the
moment the Canadian’s headquarters went operational in Normandy
on 23 July 1944. Though Montgomery had seemed to approve of
Crerar in training exercises in England, he had formed a distinctly
negative view of him in Italy where Crerar briefly commanded I
Canadian Corps. To Montgomery, the only Canadian officer capable
of higher command was Guy Simonds. Crerar and Simonds, late
in 1943 commanding the 5th Canadian Armoured Division in Italy,
sparred bitterly; so much so that Crerar thought his subordinate
mentally ill and told Montgomery so. That did not sit well with the
ernard montgomery and harry crer ar
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Simonds, Montgomery and Crerar in February 1945. [LAC 4002428]

then-commander of the Eighth Army who recognised a battle of egos
when he saw one.1
By the time Crerar had been in Normandy for a month,
Montgomery was unhappy with what he perceived as the lack of
drive in Crerar’s conduct of operations. The Field Marshal concluded
that Simonds, then leading II Canadian Corps in the vicious fighting
south of Caen, ought to be commanding First Canadian Army.
For Montgomery, the breaking point with Crerar came on 3
September. He summoned the Canadian to an important meeting at
his Tactical Headquarters to discuss his plans for Operation Market
Garden, the airborne and ground assault that aimed to secure key
bridges over the Rhine. Attending were the senior commanders of

1  
The Crerar-Simonds spat involved Crerar sending an officer to take measurements
of Simonds’ caravan without the latter’s permission. This infuriated Simonds and
led to sharp exchanges. See J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s
Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 161-62.
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21st Army Group, 12th US Army Group and the First US Army.
Apparently under the impression—the wrong impression—that the
meeting was not immediately important, Crerar opted instead to
attend the commemorative service at Dieppe, the site of the August
1942 debacle that had wiped out much of 2nd Canadian Division’s
infantry. Crerar claimed that he had not received a message stating
that it was “essential” he attend Monty’s briefing, blaming signals
problems. This was untrue; the message had been received but
Crerar had requested that it not be passed to him.2 As a result, the
eventual meeting between the Field Marshal and the General later
that day was extremely testy, with Monty chewing out Crerar and
declaring that their “ways must part.” Crerar protested that he had
good reason—indeed 800 reasons, the number of Canadian dead at
Dieppe—to miss the meeting.3
Montgomery was furious nonetheless. He “intimated that he was
not interested in my explanation,” Crerar wrote the next day to
General Kenneth Stuart, the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military
Headquarters (CMHQ) in England. “[T]he Canadian aspect of the
Dieppe ceremonial was of no importance compared to getting on with
the war.” Montgomery inferred that he would get Crerar replaced,
but the Canadian, standing on his rights as a national commander,
replied “that I assumed he would at once take this up through higher
channels and that, I, in turn, would at once report the situation to
my Government.”4
The thought that he might become embroiled in a dispute with
Ottawa apparently led Montgomery to back off. On 7 September, the
Field Marshal, pressed by Lieutenant-Colonel (Lt.-Col.) Trumball
Warren, his Canadian personal assistant, apologised to Crerar: “I
am sorry I was a bit rude the other day, and somewhat outspoken. I
was annoyed that no one [from First Canadian Army] came to a very

Paul Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.D.G.
Crerar (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 330. Dickson’s is the best
account of this incident.
3  
Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 333.
4  
As quoted in C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, Vol. III: The Operations in
North-West Europe (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1960), 305; and J.L. Granatstein,
The Best Little Army in the World: The Canadians in Northwest Europe (Toronto:
Harper Perennial, 2015), 132-33.
2  
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important conference. But forget about it—and let us get on with the
war. It was my fault.”5
Neither man would forget about it, however. Long after the war,
Montgomery wrote to Warren that Crerar had been unfit to command
an army: “What I suffered from that man!”6 The Field Marshal,
as one of his staff officers later observed, “was astonishing in his
relationship with all the Dominion troops. He ordered them around
like British troops, ignoring the devolution of the British Empire…he
was completely out of date.”7
Crerar, however, was never out of date in his understanding of the
constitutional niceties. He and Stuart had raised the constitutional
and legal issues with Montgomery before and after D-Day, arguing
strenuously that Crerar “was bound to be responsible to the Canadian
Government, in the last resort, for the operational employment of all
Canadian troops in 21 Army Group.” Montgomery on 19 June had
indicated that he understood, professing satisfaction that the “air was
properly cleared.”8
Crerar was an emotional man with a fierce temper that he
struggled to control and he was as unhappy with Montgomery as
Monty was with him. He left his 3 September meeting with the Field
Marshal in a rage. “I’ve never seen a chap so mad,” Lt.-Col. Warren
recalled when Crerar left Monty’s caravan. “That guy is not going to
get away with that,” Crerar fumed.9
The most nationalistic of Canadian commanders was not Harry
Crerar. That accolade belonged to General Andrew McNaughton,
who had led Canadian troops in England from 1939 until late 1943,
when he was removed from command of First Canadian Army. To
McNaughton, who had watched General Sir Arthur Currie sometimes
wrestle with his military superiors about control of the Canadian
Corps, “the acid test of sovereignty,” he told then Major Charles
As quoted in Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 335.
As quoted in Granatstein, Best Little Army, 135.
7  
As quoted in Granatstein, The Generals, 109.
8  
As quoted in Granatstein, The Generals, 109. Montgomery on 18 May 1944 talked
with Prime Minister Mackenzie King about his views on the legalities surrounding
command of Canadian troops in the field. See, W.L.M. King Diary, f. 502ff, Library
and Archives Canada.
9  
As quoted in Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 335. See also the Trumball
Warren interview in J.L. Granatstein, The Weight of Command: Voices of Canada’s
Second World War Generals and Those Who Knew Them (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 2016), 209-12.
5  
6  
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Stacey at their first meeting in January 1941, “is the control of the
armed forces.”10 The British resented this attitude, clearly feeling
that the war often came second to McNaughton’s insistence on the
niceties of Canadian sovereignty. General Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff (and in the Great War a staff officer
at the Canadian Corps headquarters), wrote in his diary in 1941
that McNaughton “loved to surround the employment of his Corps
with a network of ‘Convention,’ ‘Charters,’ and ‘Constitution’ which
would have rendered the employment of Canadian troops even more
difficult than that of Allies.”11
Crerar was somewhat less punctilious than McNaughton, but he
was just as much a stickler on the legalities of his and his nation’s
position and very conscious of his duties as the Senior Combatant
Officer, responsible to the government of Canada for his men. He was
also concerned with his own position, naturally enough, worried that
Montgomery’s complaints could have resulted in his removal. It was
not out of character for Crerar, a tough man when he had to be, to
turn a threat to his command of the Army into a constitutional issue.
And he did so when he wrote on 5 September to Stuart to urge that
action should be taken to alter the position of Canadian troops from
“in combination” with British forces to “serving together.” As defined
by the Visiting Forces Acts (British Commonwealth) of 1933, troops
serving together were effectively independent. Troops in combination,
however, were under unified command and in Northwest Europe for
the First Canadian Army that meant British command.12
Aware of the importance of the 1933 Act and of his right to consult
his government, as Montgomery should have been, Crerar seized on
this at the meeting on 3 September. Montgomery soon retreated
from his threat to get Crerar sacked. But only if the Canadians
were “serving together” with the British, as Crerar apparently
desired, could First Canadian Army secure an appropriate degree of
independence, enough to secure some freedom of action.13

As quoted in C.P. Stacey, “Canadian Leaders of the Second World War,” Canadian
Historical Review 66, 1 (March 1985): 67.
11  
As quoted in Granatstein, The Generals, 67.
12  
C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada 1939-45
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970), 210-13.
13  
Based on a message from Crerar to Stuart, 5 September 1944, quoted in Dickson,
A Thoroughly Canadian General, 335.
10  
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Serving under General Stuart at CMHQ was the Judge Advocate
General (JAG), Major-General Price Montague, a distinguished
Winnipeg jurist and militia officer soon to replace Stuart as Chief of
Staff at CMHQ in the rank of lieutenant-general. On his JAG staff
was Lt.-Col. George Tritschler, another prominent Winnipeg lawyer
and infantryman who had served in Italy and at First Canadian
Army headquarters.14
Many years after the war, Tritschler borrowed Charles Stacey’s
masterful official history Arms, Men and Governments from his
friend Major-General Elliott Rodger who had been Simonds’ Chief of
Staff at II Canadian Corps and Tritschler returned the book with a
brief hand-written note:
I wonder if Stacey was aware of Crearar’s [sic] proposal to have ‘his’
army freed from 21 Army Group and to enjoy the same autonomy which
the Yanks had from Monty. This was before the Ardennes crisis [the
German surprise attack in mid-December 1944] which restored the Field
Marshal’s prestige and Eisenhower placed the First U.S. Army as well
as the Ninth under Monty’s command and give him control of all Allied
ground operations on the Northern Flank of the German penetration. It
was at this stage that our brains trust felt a little sheepish and I gave
up the embarrassing file of correspondence.15

The 21st Army Group ordinarily had only the Canadians and Second
British Army under command and if Crerar’s desire to free First
Canadian Army had been pressed, Montgomery would have had very
little to control.
Crerar had always been a consummate bureaucrat, much more
adept at winning a war of memoranda than commanding a large army
in action. Montgomery may have been the master of the battlefield,
14  
“Memorable Manitobans: George Eric Tritschler (1901-1993),” Manitoba
Historical Society, last edited 1 February 2020. http://www.mhs.mb.ca/docs/people/
tritschler_ge.shtml. Tritschler would become the Chief Justice of the Manitoba
Court of Appeal from 1962 to 1973.
15  
Tritschler to Major-General Elliot Rodger, 8.6.81, attached to General Elliot
Rodger, letter to author, 12 November 2001. Stacey probably did not see Tritschler’s
file. In Arms, Men and Governments, he writes: “The right to withdraw forces from
combination…remained academic and theoretical…never exercised…never needed”
(Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 222). That was correct, but Crerar seemed
prepared to press for change. If Stacey had known of Crerar’s instruction to General
Stuart, he would surely have discussed it.
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but Crerar’s proposal was potentially a kill shot in a bureaucratic war.
His directive could have threatened Montgomery’s weakened position
in the alliance’s high command in the early autumn of 1944. There had
been much harshly negative American military and media comment
directed at Montgomery’s operations around Caen and in closing the
trap on the Germans fleeing Normandy in mid-August (much of that
griping directed at the Canadians’ performance), at the failure of
Market Garden in late September and at the missed opportunities
and subsequent delays in opening Antwerp to shipping. If word leaked
out that the Canadians were now so unhappy with Montgomery that
they were seeking ways to be liberated from his command, this would
have had serious repercussions at General Dwight Eisenhower’s
Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force in France
and in London at the War Office.
Still, Crerar’s action in seeking to safeguard his own position
and secure more autonomy would also have caused the utmost
consternation in Ottawa. Montgomery was still widely hailed as the
Commonwealth’s greatest general, an attitude held in Canada and
within the army, and the wartime Dominion was very pro-British.
If Montgomery was threatened by Crerar’s nationalism, so too was
Crerar at risk because of Canadian wartime Anglophilia and the
political crisis this military and legal spat would certainly have sparked
in Parliament and the media. Prime Minister Mackenzie King, always
preferring compromise to conflict, would not have been pleased.
What seems beyond doubt is that Crerar’s troubles with
Montgomery were extremely stressful and his physical condition
worsened through that difficult September. His biographer observes
that “his powers of decision slipped markedly” during this period and
Crerar knew all too well that Montgomery wanted to replace him
with Guy Simonds.16 Finally on 26 September, he told Montgomery
that he was ill with dysentery, anemia and stomach problems and
needed to go to England for medical assessment and treatment.
Despite his concerns for his own position and grudgingly aware
that there was no one else able to replace him, Crerar recommended
that Simonds become acting General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
of First Canadian Army. Montgomery quickly agreed, finally—if
temporarily—securing the commander he wanted for First Canadian
Army. Simonds would fight a brilliant, gruelling battle to clear the
Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 321.

16  
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Scheldt estuary and at last allow merchant ships to reach Antwerp,
raising him even higher in Montgomery’s eyes. And when Crerar was
ready to return from England to the Continent in late October, the
Field Marshal tried to prevent this, though all he could achieve was to
delay Crerar’s resumption of command to 7 November. Crerar certainly
knew of Montgomery’s efforts to get rid of him once and for all.17
Nonetheless, Crerar at root was a cautious, sensible man, aware
that Canada was only a junior partner in a vast coalition. His nation
was deeply committed to the war, he understood the limitations
on Canada’s—and his—freedom of action and he did not want to
disrupt the conduct of the war unless such action was absolutely
necessary. After his resumption of command, his relations with
Montgomery became correct but cool and there were no further direct
confrontations. Crerar, his position now secure, wisely did not press
his arguments for a change in the legal status of Canadian troops.
As Colonel Tritschler noted, by the beginning of 1945 events in the
field seemed to make Crerar’s search for more military independence
somewhat “embarrassing.” Crerar’s concerns in September for his own
position must have been obvious and no one at CMHQ seemed to want
to press efforts for military independence too hard. More than a halfcentury later, General Rodger’s comment seems appropriate: “I find
it hard to believe that ‘they’ were seriously considering having First
Canadian Army fighting as a third arm of Eisenhower’s command
instead of the British (mainly) 21 Army Group.”18
◆

◆

◆

◆
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